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Robbing the Revenue: Accounting for Deviant Behaviour 
 
It is one of the paradoxes of the study of crime that most delinquents and 
criminals are in fact generally very law abiding. They subscribe to the same 
set of standards and conventions as the rest of us do in that they are in 
agreement with fundamental laws on murder, assault and property rights. In 
deed one writer has suggested that in Britain at least most criminals vote 
Tory, hardly the action of anarchic law-breakers. 
 
This raises the question posed by David Matza (1964:27). How do people 
who claim allegiance to social norms and values engage in deviant 
behaviour?  The answer, he argues, lies in the subculture to which many 
criminals subscribe.  This comprises a set of beliefs or techniques of 
neutralisation that "function as the extenuating conditions under which 
delinquency is permissible".  These beliefs enable delinquents to violate the 
norms and rules of society without surrendering allegiance to them". They 
enable them to be law-breaking conformists. 
 
In this article I intend to develop the notion of the accounts provided by 
criminals and deviants for their behaviour.  As will become clear this kind of 
analysis has only been applied to the study of juvenile delinquents. However 
the Dail Public Accounts Committee's investigation into the manner in which 
the banks and financial institutions facilitated the evasion of tax provides an 
opportunity to see how respectable deviants account for behaviour that is 
legally and socially problematic.  
 
Matza and Sykes (1957) argue that five such beliefs enable delinquents and 
criminals to evade the moral bind of the law and the constraints of the norms 
of conventional behaviour.  They allow deviants to argue that while the law is 
fundamental there are certain circumstances in which it does not apply to 
them. The point about these beliefs is that they are generally available in the 
culture and are recognised as socially legitimate in certain circumstances.  
Where delinquent behaviour is concerned they enable young men "to commit 
crimes without too many pangs of conscience" (Box, 1983: 54).  They operate 
as "a sanitising prism …which softens criminal acts so that they assume the 
appearance of 'not really' being against the law".   This means that they have 
a double significance.  They weaken the bonds of social control and so enable 
delinquents to engage in deviant behaviour while at the same time they 
function after the act to provide defences and justifications for that behaviour.  
 
One is the denial of responsibility.  Here the deviant may accept what he did 
but does not see himself as responsible for this behaviour. Thus assault may 
be justified on the grounds that the individual was provoked by others, a 
common defence for street violence.  A second technique is the denial of 
injury.  This enables the offender to claim that, as no one was injured by his 
actions, no criminal offence is involved.  Who, for example, is harmed by the 
vandalism of public property.  Bus shelters do not cry when they are thrashed. 
This is somewhat similar to the third technique, which is the denial of the 
victim.  This involves denying that one's criminal action had a victim either 
because the victim "deserved" it or because the action was "rightful 
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retaliation".  The fourth technique is the condemnation of the condemners.  
This involves seeing those who condemn the delinquent as hypocrites, either 
because they are up to this kind of behaviour themselves or because they 
have some personal gains to be derived from such a condemnation.  The final 
technique is the appeal to higher loyalties. Here the delinquent claims that his 
action is justified in terms of loyalties and allegiances that are higher and 
more binding than those of the legal system.   Thus friendship, family ties or 
gang loyalty may justify the use of violence in specific situations without 
condoning it as a general principle. 
 
As things stand these kinds of concepts have been used to understand the 
behaviour of delinquents, categorised by Matza and Box, as lower-class 
adolescent males.  But the commission of crime is not limited to such people.  
An extensive literature shows that white-collar crime is, as both Edwin 
Sutherland (1949) and John Braithwaite (1985) acknowledge, a frequent, 
widespread and routine feature of the business world. Given that the kind of 
people who work there see themselves as the epitome of law-abiding citizens 
and indeed may be both the formulators and defenders of conventional 
morality, how then do they engage in behaviour that either is or can be 
construed as criminal? The capacity to construct justifying accounts is not 
limited to deviant or delinquent individuals. Organisations can also construct 
them. It is therefore of interest to see what kinds of accounts are provided by 
organisations to which deviant behaviour has been imputed. 
 
An opportunity to explore this issue was presented by the Parliamentary 
Inquiry into Deposit Interest Retention Tax held between August and October 
1999.  At the heart of the hearings was the degree to which DIRT was 
evaded, the extent to which "deposit-holders knowingly facilitated the 
practice" and the actions that financial institutions took to deal with the 
problem.  Their report concluded that the evasion of DIRT was "pervasive" in 
the banking sector and that "the relevant authorities were very well aware of 
the problem".  Thus the Inquiry represented an invitation to banks and 
financial institutions to account for problematic behaviour (2).  
 
The actual evasion was not exactly rocket science.  In 1986 the government 
introduced a new tax, Deposit Interest Retention Tax or as it was more 
familiarly known, DIRT.  It was a tax on interest earned on deposits in banks 
and financial institutions.  It was the responsibility of these institutions to 
calculate the amount of DIRT for which its depositors were liable, pay it to the 
revenue and deduct the relevant amount from depositors' accounts.  However 
this tax did not apply to accounts held in Irish banks by people who were not 
resident in the state.  To open a non-resident account it was merely 
necessary to fill in a form declaring that one was indeed non-resident. The 
financial institutions either encouraged residents in the state to open such 
accounts or else did not check too rigorously whether all such account-
holders were non-resident.  
 
It was also possible to avoid tax by the practice of deposit splitting.  Under 
existing tax law financial institutions could pay interest of up to £70 on deposit 
accounts without the deduction of tax.  As the evidence to the Committee 
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showed, the banks facilitated and encouraged depositors to spread their 
money over a number of different branches and accounts.  This enabled 
depositors to keep their money in a series of different deposit accounts, none 
of which individually would be liable for tax. This purpose of this strategy was 
like that of "bogus" non-resident accounts simple and straightforward. It was 
for tax evasion. 
 
So what justifications or accounts did banks and financial institutions come up 
with?  It is important to establish a relevant context with such justifications, As 
the Committee report (2000) points out, "non-compliance with the law on 
DIRT by depositors and deposit-takers is a Revenue Offence.  As such it is 
also a criminal offence.  This was established in a landmark judgement in 
1945 (State versus Fawsett).  Hence it does seem, to the outsider at least, to 
be the kind of behaviour that needs to be accounted for. 
 
What is interesting about the proceeding of the Committee was the degree to 
which those coming before it did not fell the need to offer extensive 
justifications for the tax evasion that went on in their institutions.  To the extent 
that such justifications were offered they were largely seen as technical 
matters and there was no real sense in the presentations that the banks and 
other financial institutions had done anything wrong. 
 
One of the justifications offered was to see the problem as one of paperwork 
or to blame the complicated nature of the relevant form. To establish a non-
resident account it was necessary for a depositor to fill in Form 37 declaring 
that he or she was non-resident.  According to the bankers, it was either too 
complicated or else if it had been filled in by the depositor there was little need 
or incentive to check it. One banker told the Committee that "the feeling was 
that once the declarations were complete or once the declarations were there, 
and in some instances even if they weren't, that once the depositor said "I am 
a non-resident", then that was almost taken as good enough".  Another 
banker told the Committee that the issue "in so far as it existed at all, was 
merely documentary". 
 
The second justification was to blame someone else, in this case those lower 
down the organisational food chain. Senior officials in the banks said that they 
relied on Branch and Regional Managers to ensure legal compliance but 
these failed in that task.  This mystified some senior officials. The former Chief 
Executive Officer of the Bank of Ireland told the Committee that "I really find it 
very hard to understand how any member of our staff would have 
accommodated - knowingly accommodated - a bogus non-resident account.  I 
find this very hard to understand".  Where another bank was concerned, in 
this case, Ulster Bank, "a scrupulous adherence to formal compliance seems 
to have been dictated from the top" but "this was at variance with the practice 
discovered by Internal Audit in parts of the Branch network".  Another banker 
said (of his bank) the failure of branches to comply with direct instructions on 
the issue and the fact that written assurances by Branch managers…were 
found to be materially untrue" was the source of the difficulty. 
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Others were less mystified by the problem. They cited the pressures of 
competition for deposits at local level branch level.  One official told the 
Committee that " the imposition of withholding tax was going to have a 
negative effect on its business and it was seeking to investigate 
methodologies whereby that negative effect might be lessened". The 
Chairman of the Committee replied this " is a very troubling sentence".  
Another banker told the Committee that a Branch Manager told his Regional 
Manager that his branch was loosing deposits through not opening bogus 
non-resident accounts. The branch continued to open them even after an 
internal audit had insisted on a mass reclassification of bogus accounts.  The 
problem for them was the loss of business.  Their competitors were doing it.  If 
they did not behave in a similar fashion their customers would take their 
money elsewhere.  
 
The final justification was that the Board of Directors either didn’t know or 
were not told. A number of statements to the Committee indicated that the 
matter was never discussed at Board level in the major banks. Beyond these, 
there is little evidence of any attempts or any need to attempt to offer 
justifications for the pervasive culture of non-compliance with tax laws in the 
banking sector.  What is most striking about the accounts given by the Banks 
is the limited extent to which they felt the need to defend themselves or to 
explain why, as the Committee found, they encouraged and facilitated tax 
evasion. 
 
This highlights an important difference between juvenile delinquents and 
white-collar deviants. The former use techniques of neutralisation to justify 
their behaviour when they are challenged about it either by having to explain it 
to probation officers, policemen or the courts.   The latter seldom have their 
deviance or criminality dramatised for them in this way and so operate in 
some security from the threat of apprehension and public explanation.  This 
was clearly the case with the facilitation of the evasion of DIRT tax.  The 
regulating authorities knew about it but there was little indication of serious 
moves to deal with it.  A Mr. Pat Molloy of the Bank of Ireland wrote to his 
Board of Directors in 1986.  He concluded, "it was not at all certain that the 
Revenue Commissioners have the will or the capacity to effectively police the 
DIRT regime". 
 
One auditor told the hearings that the tax regime was "lightly policed" by the 
Revenue.  The Committee also found that Boards of Directors for banks and 
other financial institutions "betrayed an overly relaxed attitude towards 
discharging their statutory and fiduciary duties in respect of the operation of 
DIRT".  In that sense the fact that the banks did not offer elaborate 
justifications for the behaviour of their institutions was simply because there 
was no established tradition of them having to.  They existed in a situation 
where there was no need to justify their culture of non-compliance because 
there was no real desire by the relevant authorities to enforce the relevant 
legislation.  This was despite the fact that the authorities were well aware of 
the problem.  When one former senior official from the Revenue was asked 
what level of knowledge did the Commissioners have of the situation 
regarding the abuse of non-resident accounts, he replied "we all knew".  
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Similarly the Comptroller and Auditor General argued, "the relevant authorities 
were very well aware of the problem". 
 
It is in this sense that consideration of the contexts of justification for white-
collar deviants needs to move beyond the deviants and on to the policing 
agencies.  White-collar deviants are seldom placed in public situations where 
they are required to defend their behaviour so the focus must move to the 
justifications offered by policing agencies for their failure to act. The source of 
non-enforcement of tax legislation can be found in what Matza has referred to 
as "higher loyalties". The matter was not treated within the confines of 
revenue law and its possibilities for criminal enforcement.  It was considered 
within the confines of an economic theory.  This was the theory of capital 
flight.  This held that if the law on tax evasion was rigorously enforced it would 
lead depositors to take their money out of Irish banks, move it to foreign ones.  
In the process this would create a crisis in the banking system and undermine 
the value of the Irish currency on international financial markets. The 
Committee indicates that, "all of the relevant agencies of state bought into this 
theory as being relevant. It became the official view".  The belief was that 
"over-enthusiastic action by anyone could lead to a flight of funds". As the 
Committee pointed out this proposition "sits somewhat uncomfortably 
alongside the law as enacted".  The theory was also, as the Committee 
pointed out, untested and probably incorrect. 
 
The belief in capital flight appears to have effectively paralysed the two major 
state agencies, the Revenue Commissioners and the Central Bank.  It 
provided the context in which decisions were made and in which policy 
choices were made. The evidence from former officials of the Central Bank 
indicated that they were well aware of the problem of tax evasion generally 
and DIRT evasion in particular.   They also discussed it with the Department 
of Finance.  They failed to use the powers available to them and indeed 
opposed attempts to introduce "increased documentary evidence of non-
residence", most notably in the form of a sworn affidavit of non-residency.  
The argument against this was that the "expense and inconvenience" that this 
would impose on non-residents "would cause over 50% of non-resident 
deposits to move abroad".  Similarly officials from the Department of Finance 
relied on the argument about the fear of capital flight to avoid tightening up of 
the operation of DIRT.  There was a loyalty higher than that to revenue law.  
This was to the laws of capitalist economics. 
 
For David Matza (1964: 41) the one characteristic that convinced him that 
delinquents are committed to conventional rather than delinquent or criminal 
values was the fact that when they were apprehended and confronted with 
their behaviour they initially express indignation but they then proceed to 
"either contriteness or defensive explanations".  The failure of those involved 
in the DIRT Inquiry to express either emotions indicates that unlike juvenile 
delinquents, white-collar offenders may be committed to a sub-culture in 
which such reactions are appropriate.  There is after all a final "account" that 
deviants can offer.  Erving Goffman (1971) called it "the apology".  This 
involves explicitly confessing to ones errors and accepting that sanctions were 
expected and legitimate.  
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Speaking at the Annual meeting of the shareholders of Allied Irish Banks an 
din the aftermath of paying £30.5 million to the State in overdue DIRT, interest 
and penalties, the Chairman, said that the whole DIRT business was an 
"unhappy episode" and "a regrettable episode".  It seems that in this context 
that power and status are a bit like love.  They mean never having to say you 
are sorry. 
 
One thing is clear from the D.I.R.T. hearings. Powerful financial institutions did 
not have to provide much by the way of explanation or justification to account 
for their facilitation of tax evasion.  This was largely because nobody in 
authority really saw it as a serious problem.   The institutions were allowed to 
see the issue of compliance with tax legislation as merely a technical matter 
to be sorted out between officials of like mind.  This attitude was facilitated by 
the manner in which tax officials move from positions in the revenue service 
and the Department of Finance to senior positions in the financial institutions 
and in the Central Bank.  If this kind of rotation of personnel is combined with 
the existence of a shared community of assumptions between banks, the 
revenue commissioners and the Central Bank, then this group has the 
necessary qualifications for being identified as a power elite.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Matza was writing in less gender sensitive times and so used the male 
personal pronoun "he" in all of his work.  He may also have been reflecting 
the fact that most delinquents who come to the attention of the law are 
male.  
2. The accounts presented here are drawn from the report of the Committee 
of Public Accounts on its Parliamentary Inquiry into DIRT.  A fuller account 
would need to include the investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General into DIRT evasion. 
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